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Introduction

In the spring of 2012, we were privileged to organize and present a panel on “Redistricting in
New England” at the Annual Meeting of the New England Political Science Association (NEPSA) in
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. This booklet consists of papers that are based on the presentations
made by the panelists and, in one case (Rhode Island), a paper written by two of our students in a
2011 Congressional Redistricting course at Clark University.
The United States Constitution requires that
the number of representatives in Congress be
reapportioned among the states based on a decennial
census, and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled half a
century ago that congressional districts within each
state must be, as nearly as practicable, equal in
population. However, the actual drawing of district
lines for our national lower house and the methods
employed for doing so are largely left to the individual
states. Redistricting thus presents a fertile field for
the comparative examination of state politics and
political institutions.
New England has become, by many measures, the
most Democratic-leaning region in the United States.
It might seem, at first, that this would make redistricting
in this region rather uninteresting. However, in four
of its five states that redrew congressional district
lines after the 2010 census (Vermont, because of its
small population, has had but one district since 1933),
partisan considerations played a significant part in the
recent round of redistricting. As the papers collected
here vividly demonstrate, the outcomes of each state’s
redistricting processes reflect the interplay of a variety
of factors:

• the possibility of achieving partisan gain — even
in the “zero sum” situation of the two-district
states — through the delicate calculus of improving
a party’s chances enough to win one district, while
diminishing their chances just enough so as not to
lose the other (Maine, New Hampshire, and Rhode
Island);
• the possibility that, because of the unusual state
laws regarding the allocation of electoral votes,
redistricting could conceivably affect the outcome
of a future presidential election (Maine);
• the role of independent, nonpartisan redistricting
entities in redrawing a state’s district lines
(Connecticut and Maine);
• the appeal, to legislators, judges, and citizens, of
maintaining the status quo or something close to it
when drawing new district boundaries (Connecticut,
Maine, and New Hampshire).

• the very different responses by the majority party in
the state legislature to a perceived electoral threat to
a co-partisan member of Congress (New Hampshire
and Rhode Island);
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The only state where complete one-party control of
the congressional delegation appeared secure from the
outset — Massachusetts — was also the only state in
the region that was losing a seat, due to the Bay State’s
slow growth relative to the rest of the nation over
the past decade. The “musical chairs” nature of that
process was unique in the region for this decade.
One theme that emerges from this examination of
the 2010 round of redistricting in the five states is the
relative invisibility of the process to voters. There are
many possible explanations for this. It may be because
most voters tended to wind up in a similar district to
their previous one, because most voters calculated
that line-drawing decisions would have little impact
on things they cared about, or simply because voters
were unaware of the process (an unawareness no
doubt abetted by the relative lack of media coverage
of redistricting). Whatever the reason, the state-bystate accounts here show that there is little citizen
engagement in the redistricting process. Also, because
of the relative homogeneity of the population in the
region and its relatively placid recent history regarding
voter qualifications and procedures, considerations of
race and the Voting Rights Act played only a small role
in the region’s drawing of new district lines.
We are publishing these articles in part because we
believe that today, far more than in previous years,
citizens have the tools to engage constructively in
redistricting. In our experience at Clark teaching
students about the process (discussed in our article
“Teaching Redistricting to Undergraduates: Letting
the People Draw the Lines for the People’s House,” PS:
Political Science & Politics 46 (2): 387-394), we were

struck by our students’ interest in the process and their
efforts to consider the broader public interest in their
own line-drawing efforts. We offer these essays with
the hope that we can add to the historical record that
will guide policymakers and citizens the next time New
England’s congressional district lines are drawn.
We are grateful for the knowledge, insight, and
expository skills of all of our colleagues who authored
the articles in this compendium: John Baughman,
Diana Evans, Amelia Najjar, Nicholas Rossi, and Dante
Scala. We also thank Maureen Moakley who made
the presentation on Rhode Island at the Portsmouth
meeting and advised on the Rhode Island article herein.
We owe a special debt of thanks to Nicholas Giner,
our co-author on the Massachusetts article, who also
applied his skills as a geographer to produce the maps
for each of the state articles. Finally, we gratefully
acknowledge the generous support of Clark University’s
Mosakowski Institute for Public Enterprise, which made
both the NEPSA panel and this booklet possible.

Jim Gomes			

Robert Boatright

Director			Associate Professor
Mosakowski Institute for 		
Political Science
Public Enterprise		
Clark University
Clark University
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Redi strict i ng i n Co nnecti cut, 201 1 -201 2
Diana Evans*

Redistricting in Connecticut is not the
usual raw partisan affair, although
partisanship plays a significant role.
The Connecticut Constitution, Article
III, Section 6, requires the appointment
of a bipartisan “reapportionment
committee” by legislative leaders of
both parties; the committee consists
of an equal number of Republicans and
Democrats. The timeline is as follows:
By Feb. 15, “the general assembly shall
appoint a reapportionment committee
consisting of four members of the
senate, two who shall be designated
by the president pro tempore of
the senate and two who shall be
designated by the minority leader of
the senate, and four members of the
house of representatives, two who
shall be designated by the speaker
of the house of representatives
and two who shall be designated
by the minority leader of the house
of representatives” (Connecticut
Constitution, Article III, Section 6).
Those leaders virtually always select
themselves and a top deputy or other
loyalist.
If that committee agrees on a plan
before Sept. 15, it is presented to the
General Assembly, which must adopt
the plan by a 2/3 majority for it to take
effect. If the redistricting committee
fails to adopt a plan by Sept. 15, the
governor is required to appoint a
“reapportionment commission” which,
in practice, consists of the existing
eight-member committee and a ninth
member chosen within thirty days by
the original eight members. Although
the ninth member obviously was
intended to serve as a tie-breaker,
historically he played that role only in
the 1981 redistricting; in other years,
that member has been neutral, as he
was, by explicit agreement among
commission members, in 2011. If the
commission adopts a redistricting plan
by a simple majority by November 30,
the plan becomes law.

However, if the commission fails to
meet the November 30 deadline
or if an adopted plan is appealed,
the Connecticut Supreme Court
takes over. The court may order the
redistricting commission to alter its
plan or it may draw up its own plan.
The Supreme Court must issue or
approve a final plan by February 15. In
2011, the commission failed to adopt
a plan for Congress and the Supreme
Court intervened.
Redistricting in Connecticut is
designed to be controlled by the
General Assembly’s party leadership;
therefore, partisanship is inevitably
and intentionally at the heart of the
process. However, each party is given
equal power; even the appointment of
the ninth member must be minimally
bipartisan. As long as the redistricting
commission controls the process,
any plan to which it agrees must
be bipartisan. If the commission is
committed to devising a plan before
the Supreme Court has a chance to
take over, each party can be expected
to minimize its losses. That is because
neither party is in a position to make
major gains at the other party’s
expense, as would be the case with
purely partisan gerrymandering.
Thus, if the two parties enjoy an even
division of seats, any plan to which the
commission agrees is likely to protect
the status quo, meaning incumbents.
However, several factors can
introduce a potentially destabilizing
set of threats and opportunities:
the loss or gain of a seat in the
decennial reapportionment, the
emergence of one or more open
seats, or the existence of substantial
seat advantage to one party.
Such circumstances increase the
incentive for one party or the other
to withhold agreement and gamble
on the Supreme Court. That is what
happened in 2011-12.

Redistricting in 2001:
Co n n e c t i c u t Lo s e s a
Di s t r i c t

In the 1990s, Connecticut’s population
grew less than that of many other
states; as a consequence, the state lost
one of its six congressional districts
in the 2001 reapportionment. Not
surprisingly, the ensuing redistricting
process was unusually contentious but
nevertheless produced a bipartisan
compromise: it essentially combined
the 5th District, represented by
Democrat Jim Maloney, and the 6th
District, held by Republican Nancy
Johnson. The commission did so
by shifting the boundaries of the
surrounding districts in such a way that
their partisan balance was not upset,
and by drawing the new 5th district
to make it as competitive as possible,
giving both incumbents a reasonable
chance of winning it.1
The resulting 5th district encompassed
much of northwestern portion of the
state. Approximately 21 percent of the
population is in Republican-leaning
Litchfield County, which had been part
of Johnson’s old district. Some of the
more Democratic-leaning cities of the
of old 5th district, cities that had been
in Maloney’s base, were also included
in the new 5th district. However, in the
interest of creating a competitive 5th
district and protecting incumbents in
the other four districts, one of the key
Democratic towns — Bristol — was
carved out and placed in the heavily
Democratic 1st district, as were some
of the smaller Republican-leaning
towns of the northeastern part of the
old 6th district. The resulting 2001
map (Figure 1) was characterized
by a “claw” shape (formed by the
1st district) on its eastern boundary,

1 The

Republican, Nancy Johnson, won the 2002
election by a relatively narrow 54 percent.

*Professor of Political Science, Trinity College
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laying the groundwork for a Republican
challenge to any Democratic map that
preserved that shape.
In the first two elections following the
2001 redistricting, Republicans enjoyed
an advantage, holding three of the
five House seats (including the new
5th District), despite the fact that the
state had been trending Democratic
for a number of years. However, in the
Democratic wave elections of 2006
and 2008, all three Republicans lost
their seats, upsetting the partisan
balance and giving Republican
redistricters in 2011 less to lose by
proposing a more radical redistricting
plan, one that was virtually certain to
throw the decision to the Supreme
Court.
Redistricting in 2011

The leaders of each party in each
chamber appointed themselves and a
member of their respective leadership
teams to the redistricting committee.
The co-chairs were Senate President
Pro Tempore Donald Williams (D)
and House Minority Leader Lawrence
Cafero (R). The other two legislative
leaders on the committee were House
Speaker Christopher Donovan (D)
and Senate Minority Leader John
McKinney (R). However, Speaker
Donovan, as a candidate for the
open 5th District House seat, was
pressured by Republicans to resign
(although that pressure did not come
from the Republican members of the
commission itself), which he did on
Nov. 30 after the state legislative
district plan was completed but
before significant work began on the
congressional map. He appointed
Majority Leader Brendan Sharkey to
take his place.

The committee held six public hearings
in July 2011, in Hartford (two hearings),
New Haven, Norwich, Norwalk and
Waterbury. Testimony was given by
a number of state House members
as well as citizens’ groups such as
Common Cause and the Latino and
Puerto Rican Affairs Commission, along
with a number of interested individuals.
Much of the testimony pertained to
state legislative districts, but there
was some comment on congressional
districts as well.
The Reapportionment Committee
(as it was officially known) took as
its first task the redrawing of the
state’s 187 House and Senate districts.
The Committee acknowledged on
September 9 that, as in 1991 and
2001, it would fail to meet its Sept.
15 deadline to redraw lines for the
state districts, necessitating the
appointment of a ninth member.
(Pazniokas, Sept. 9, 2011). After the
Sept. 15 deadline, the Committee
officially became the Reapportionment
Commission and appointed former
Democratic State Auditor Kevin
Johnston as its ninth member.
However, the Commission, following
past precedent, was committed not
to cede the process to Johnston’s
potentially tie-breaking vote; rather,
they decided either to reach a
bipartisan compromise or turn the
process over to the Supreme Court
for the first time ever (Pazniokas,
November 30, 2011). Indeed, according
to the Connecticut Mirror, Johnston was
not part of the daily negotiations at all
(Pazniokas, Nov. 22, 2011).
The Commission unanimously
approved state legislative districts in
late November, but had made little
progress on congressional districts,
ensuring that formal control of the
redistricting process would pass to the
Supreme Court. However, the Court,

Figure 1: Connecticut Congressional
Districts, 2002-2010
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Figure 2: House/Senate Congressional
District Exchange, 11/10/2011

in an effort to keep redistricting in the
hands of legislative leaders, extended
the Commission’s deadline until
December 21.
In Connecticut, congressional districts
have to be (as in every other state)
as nearly equal in population as
practicable. Given shifts in the state’s
population of 3,574,097 (United States
Census 2010), the largest change
was to be made to the 2nd District,
comprising the entire eastern portion of
the state; 15,000 people in that district
would have to be moved to adjacent
districts to produce an average district
size across the state of approximately
714,819 people. Although it is not
legally required, redistricters generally
attempt not to split any of the state’s
169 towns into more than one district.
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Figure 3: Map Proposed by Connecticut
Republicans

Figure 4: Democratic (left) and Republican Plans Compared

The large number of towns relative to
population makes this relatively easy to
achieve, with only a few exceptions as
required to achieve population equality
or political goals.

to New Haven, another overwhelming
Democratic city. That change would
have left the 4th district even more
heavily dominated by affluent Fairfield
County, with its more Republican
inclinations. This proposal prompted
accusations from minority group
representatives, including the NAACP,
that Republicans were attempting
to “bleach” the 4th District without
significantly increasing the probability
of electing a minority representative in
the 3rd District.

If the objective were to maintain the
status quo, the relatively small changes
required by population shifts between
2000 and 2001 would mean that the
pre-existing partisan balance could
rather easily be maintained. Thus,
the Commission’s four Democrats
proposed a map that largely
maintained existing boundaries, while
shifting lines slightly to add population
to all but the 2nd District (Figure 2).
Yet despite the fact that the largest
changes were required in the
eastern part of the state, Republican
redistricters focused on the western
districts, where they saw the greatest
potential for gains (Figure 3). They
proposed a map that would have made
the newly Democratic 4th District
solidly Republican, and shifted the 5th
to a more Republican leaning as well.
Indeed, until Democrat Jim Himes’
defeat of Chris Shays in 2008, the
4th district had consistently elected
moderate Republicans to the House.
The Republicans’ major proposal for
that district would have moved the
Democratic city of Bridgeport out
of the 4th District into the already
heavily Democratic 3rd District, home

By the court-imposed December
21 deadline, Republicans on the
redistricting commission had backed
off that proposal but continued to
pursue the second part of their plan,
which involved drawing the 5th
District’s lines in a manner more
favorable to Republican candidates
(Altimari, Dec. 22, 2011). As the
5th District was to be an open seat
in 2012, it offered the best chance
for a Republican gain in 2012. The
Republican plan again moved a heavily
Democratic city — New Britain —
from the 5th District to the already
Democratic 1st District. It also moved
Torrington, which is competitive, and
some smaller Republican towns from
the 1st into the 5th; both changes
would make the 5th more Republican.
To accomplish this goal, Republican
map-makers increased the

compactness of the district. Their
map eliminated the 1st District’s
claw around heavily Democratic New
Britain, drawing that city into the 1st
District and moving back into the
5th District six Republican-leaning
towns currently in the northwestern
part of the 1st District: Colebrook,
Hartland, Barkhamsted, New Hartford
and Granby. Figure 4 compares
the Democrats’ and Republicans’
proposals.
However, Democrats, especially
African-American Democrats,
strenuously opposed those changes as
well: although the 1st District’s minority
population would have grown from 35
percent to 40 percent, the minority
population in the 5th District would
have declined from 27 percent to 20
percent. Given that the 1st District was
already solidly Democratic and the 5th
District was much more competitive,
that change might have resulted in a
net decline in minority group influence
by making it no more likely that the 1st
District would elect a Democrat and
less likely that the 5th District would
do so. “Black and Latino politicians, all
Democrats, said the Republicans’ claim
that their plan would have enhanced
chances for a minority candidate to
eventually be elected in the 1st was
a pretext. If the GOP was interested
in helping minorities, they might
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2. I n developing the plan, the Special
Master shall modify the existing
congressional districts only to
the extent reasonably required to
comply with the following applicable
legal requirements:
a. Districts shall be as equal in
population as is practicable.
b. Districts shall be made of
contiguous territory.
Figure 5: Special Master’s Plan;
Connecticut Congressional
Districts 2012

have consulted with the legislature’s
Black and Puerto Rican Caucus, said
Rep. Gary Holder-Winfield, D-New
Haven. ‘That didn’t happen,’ he said”
(Pazniokas, Dec. 21, 2011).
Given the disparity between the two
parties’ proposals and the lack of
incentive of either to compromise, the
commission failed to reach agreement
by its court-imposed deadline of Dec.
21. House Minority Leader Lawrence
Cafero said that the two parties had
agreed on all but 13 towns, “with most
of the disagreement centering around
the ragged border of the 1st and 5th
districts. ‘I think it boils down to New
Britain,’ Cafero said” (Pazniokas, Dec.
21, 2011).
On December 28, the Hartford
Courant reported that the Supreme
Court would appoint a special master
(from candidates nominated by
commission members) to redraw the
district lines. On December 30, the
Court chose political scientist and
lawyer Nathan Persily of the Columbia
University Law School. Within days,
the Court essentially tied the special
master’s hands, issuing the following
instructions:

c. The plan shall comply with 42
U.S.c. § 1973(b) and with other
applicable provisions of the Voting
Rights Act and federal law.
3. I n no event shall the plan of the
Special Master be substantially
less compact than the existing
congressional districts and in no
event shall the plan of the Special
Master substantially violate
town lines more than the existing
congressional districts. (Supreme
Court, Jan. 23, 2012)
The key to the eventual outcome is in
the instructions on compactness: in (3)
above, the Court ordered that districts
not be made less compact than they
currently were, but did not require that
they be made more compact, a key
feature of the Republican proposal.
Given that the special master was
also ordered to approve only minimal
changes to the existing map, it was
unlikely that he, or, more importantly,
the Court, would approve the
Republican proposal.
Indeed, the Democratic proposal had
the clear advantage. As the Connecticut
Mirror reported, “The Democratic plan
makes no changes in 164 of the 169
towns. It equalizes the populations
of the districts by shifting the lines in
four communities currently divided
between two districts: Glastonbury,
Middletown, Shelton and Waterbury.
Durham, now split between the 2nd

and 3rd districts, would be united in the
3rd. Torrington, which is split between
the 1st and 5th, would be unchanged”
(Pazniokas, January 6, 2012).
In a public hearing before the special
master, held on Jan. 9, Republican
commission members argued correctly
that the current 5th district acquired
its “bizarre” shape as a result of the
merging of districts in 2001. Given that
the 5th District was gerrymandered
to make it competitive between two
incumbents, Republicans essentially
argued that its lines should not be
considered sacrosanct and that
greater compactness should and easily
could be achieved in redistricting.
As Republicans argued in an earlier
brief to the Supreme Court, between
the reapportionment of 1964, when
Connecticut was awarded its sixth
congressional district, and 1991, the
maps “reflected compact districts and
aligned communities of interest.” Thus,
Republicans argued that the Court
should return to that standard and treat
the 2001 map as an anomaly. (Supreme
Court, Reply of the Republican
Members of the Reapportionment
Commission, 2011).
By contrast, Democrats argued that
their own map, which largely preserved
the status quo, had stood the test of
time and had not been subject to legal
challenges. Moreover, they noted that
the district had proved competitive, as
it had been won twice by a Republican
and three times by a Democrat.
On January 13, Special Master Persily
issued his draft report; as instructed,
he made minimal changes to the
existing map (Figure 5). He noted
that while his plan achieved slightly
greater compactness, “Both the Special
Master’s Plan and the Democrats’ Plan
reunite Durham and split Glastonbury,
Middletown, Shelton, Torrington, and
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Waterbury” (Persily 2012, p. 25).
Thus, the towns contested by the
Republicans stayed where they were
placed in 2001.
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Ca n ’ t G e t T he r e Fro m H e r e: Maine’s Circuitous 2011 Redistricting
John Baughman*

Nationally, the 2010 election gave
Republicans not only a large majority
in the U.S. House of Representatives
by recent standards — and their
largest caucus since the Truman
Administration — but enough victories
in state legislatures to suggest they
could use the redistricting process
to maintain their majority past 2012.
After that election, they had legislative
majorities in 25 states, the most since
1928. This gave Republicans arguably
their greatest advantage in redistricting
in a century, and certainly since the
advent of the modern redistricting
process in 1962.1
The results in Maine seemed to be
of a piece. For the first time in almost
half a century, Republicans won the
governorship and majorities in both
chambers of the state legislature.
Not only had the party won control,
but the conservative Tea Party wing
was ascendant at the expense of the
more moderate state Republican
establishment. To the surprise of
many both inside the party and out,
conservatives were able to replace the
establishment’s party platform with a
much more conservative, Tea Partyinspired alternative (Wickenheiser
2010). With these victories came
great expectations, including the hope
that redrawing the state’s legislative
and congressional districts might help
Republicans. As one Republican voter
said at a public hearing on the party’s
map, elections have consequences.
Nevertheless, the experience in
Maine appears at odds with these
expectations. After Republicans
proposed a bold redrawing of the
state’s two congressional districts, the
state legislature approved a plan that
was nearly identical to the previous
map and provided the GOP negligible
advantage. Institutional and political
constraints prevented Republicans

from using their majority to reshape
Maine electoral politics, although they
could claim a small victory in shifting
the redistricting calendar to conform to
the rest of the country.
H i sto ry a n d P ro c e ss

Maine is one of three states that
use an advisory panel to hold public
hearings and to draft redistricting
recommendations for the state
legislature, here called the Legislative
Apportionment Commission. The
commission has 15 members, seven
appointed by the Democrats and
seven by the Republicans, with the
fifteenth member selected by the
other commissioners and serving as
chair.2 In practice, because the major
parties typically submit two competing
plans for consideration, this means
the recommended plan is determined
by that fifteenth commissioner. After
a recommendation has been made,
the legislature has 120 days to act.
Congressional redistricting in Maine
occurs through an act of the legislature,
signed by the governor, and requires
a two-thirds vote of each chamber.
Should they fail to act by the deadline,
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
takes responsibility for the redistricting.
In other ways Maine has been even
more unusual in its electoral practices.
Throughout much of the 19th century,
election dates varied widely from state
to state, sometimes by more than a
year. An 1872 federal law standardized
federal elections on the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November of
even numbered years. However, that
law made an exception for those states
which had an election date specified in
their state constitutions. So it was for
Maine. Not until 1958, several decades
after the last state, did it revert to the
national standard.

Two more recent deviations from
national practice are relevant here.
First, since the 1972 election Maine
has allocated its Electoral College
votes by congressional district, one
elector per district plus two for the
candidate winning the statewide
vote. Second, by state law starting
in 1983, congressional redistricting
has been conducted in the third year
after a decennial census, rather than
in the second year as in every other
state. Both of these variants, the latter
unique in the country and the former
nearly so, affected party strategy in the
redistricting that occurred following
the 2010 census.
R e p u b li c a n G a m b i t

The strategy of Maine Republicans had
two linked elements, to draw a map
more favorable to their candidates and
to change the date the map would take
effect in order to increase its impact.
To redraw the map, the most direct
route would be to have it approved
by the commission, and they would
need to convince its nonpartisan chair.
As a result, in addition to a strategic
motivation the plan put forward had
also a public rationale.
Ever since Maine went from three
congressional districts to two following
the 1960 census, the line dividing
the first district from the second has
followed a very similar path:
1

 ecause there was no reapportionment following the
B
1920 census, the last time the Republican Party had
such influence over redistricting was after the 1910
census.

2

 o be more specific, three commissioners are selected
T
by the state House majority leader and three by
the minority leader, two each from the state Senate
majority and minority leaders, one by the chair of the
Maine Democratic Party, and one by the chair of the
Maine Republican Party. Each party’s contingent of
six appointees chooses a seventh from the public, and
these two partisan commissioners select the fifteenth
member.

*Associate Professor of Political Science, Bates College
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A southern, largely coastal district
ranged from Kittery at the New
Hampshire border northeast to
Camden and inland to Augusta, with
the second district comprising the
much sparser and more expansive
remainder of the state. The two
districts corresponded roughly to
what some call the “two Maines”
with one poorer, more rural and more
conservative than the other (Fried
2012). Adjustments to account for
population migrations following Baker
v. Carr involved shifting towns from the
first district to the second — usually
in Kennebec, Waldo and Knox
counties — creating districts that
became progressively even more
divergent in their land mass and
urbanicity. Figure 1 shows Maine’s two
congressional districts as they stood
before redistricting.
Instead, Republicans proposed using
a north-south boundary to divide the
first and second districts, as shown in
Figure 2. It was a dramatic shift from
practices of the previous half century,
and also yielded a sharp contrast with
the Democratic plan (shown in Figure
3), which would retain something far
closer to the status quo. In a state of
1.3 million people, about 300,000
would have changed districts under the
Republican plan whereas only a few
thousand would have done so in the
incremental Democratic alternative.
The Maine GOP reasoned that their
plan would reduce the socioeconomic
divisions between the two districts,
but the Republican plan, would also
serve a strategic purpose. The shifts
would have added far more Republican
voters to the first district, making the
seat less safely Democratic, and at
the same time the current Democratic
incumbents, Chellie Pingree and
Mike Michaud, would be forced to
run against each other in the second
district (Metzler 2011). If the cards
fell right, the strategy could net

Republicans two seats in the House. As
a further constraint on the Democrats,
they insisted that any redistricting plan
ought to leave a population difference
of only a single resident, as theirs did.
The second prong in their strategy
involved moving the effective date for
Maine’s congressional redistricting
to 2012 in order to conform to the
rest of the country. Under state law,
redistricting would not occur until 2013
and take effect with the 2014 midterm
election. Two Republicans living in the
1st district, which had gained several
thousand residents since the previous
census compared with the 2nd, filed
suit in federal district court, arguing
that this diluted the value of their vote
in the 2012 election in violation of the
one-person, one-vote principle outlined
in Baker v. Carr (Hench 2011). Named
as defendants were Gov. Paul LePage,
President of the Maine Senate Kevin
Raye, Speaker of the Maine House
Robert Nutting, and Maine Secretary
of State Charles Summers. All these
defendants, however, were Republicans
and supportive of the lawsuit, and Raye
was running in the Republican primary
to be the party’s nominee for the 2nd
district race.
Although Republicans did not say
so publicly, presidential politics
helped to motivate their strategy.
The reason has to do with another
of Maine’s peculiarities. As noted
above, since the 1972 election Maine
has allocated its Electoral College
votes by congressional district. It has
not yet resulted in a split vote, but it
has affected election strategy in the
state on multiple occasions.3 Ross
Perot came closest in 1992, finishing
less than five percentage points away
3

 ebraska, which has also allocated its electors by
N
congressional district since 1992, did split its votes in
2008, with Barack Obama winning the 2nd district in
Omaha while John McCain won the other Nebraska
districts and the state popular vote.

Figure 1: Maine Congressional Districts,
2002-2010
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Figure 2: Maine Congressional
Districts — Republican Plan

Figure 3: Maine Congressional
Districts — Democratic Plan
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from winning an elector. With the
state becoming more Democratic over
the last two decades of presidential
elections, Republicans have seen the
2nd district as their best, and arguably
only, shot at winning an electoral vote
in the state, with the George W. Bush
and John McCain campaigns devoting
resources there. Barack Obama
received 55 percent of the district’s
vote in 2008 and would receive 53
percent in the new district in 2012.
Even the 2nd district, consistently the
more conservative of the two, has begun
to slip out of reach for Republicans — in
2010, an excellent year for Republicans,
Mike Michaud (D) won reelection
by 13 percentage points (Sambides
2010) — raising the stakes for this
redistricting effort. Moving Republican
voters from the 1st district to the 2nd
would cede three of four electoral votes
to Democrats while making the race for
that fourth elector more competitive.
Not since Rutherford Hayes vs. Samuel
Tilden in 1876 has a presidential race
come down to a single electoral vote,
but there were plausible scenarios
that would have produced a 269-269
outcome in 2012 — or 270-268 in favor
of Republicans were they to peel away
an elector in Maine (Goodman 2011).4
The strategy was in keeping with
national GOP conversations about
how to tilt the electoral map in their
favor in 2012 and beyond. Pennsylvania
Republicans, for example, came
close to enacting a law to allocate its
electoral votes by congressional district
in the manner of Maine and Nebraska.
The state has voted for the Democratic
nominee since 1992 and in recent
years has been shedding its reputation
as a swing state to become solidly
Democratic in presidential elections.
State GOP leaders believed that such
a system, together with strategic
redistricting, would benefit the party’s
presidential chances (Silver 2011;
Seelye 2011).

D e m o c r at i c R e s p o n s e

O u tco m e

The Democrats chose to defend the
status quo, or at least something very
close to it. The plan they put forward
proposed only incremental changes
of the sort used since 1962, shifting
a single town from the 1st district to
the 2nd in order to create more equal
populations but preserving the shape
of the previous map (Metzler 2011).
This would have kept the 1st district
solidly Democratic, the 2nd district
leaning Democratic, and both of the
party’s incumbents in safe and familiar
constituencies. Indeed, it was precisely
the incrementalism that they used in
trying to persuade the nonpartisan
commission chair, Michael Friedman,
to adopt their plan over the Republican
one. Friedman asked the parties to
submit new plans in order to find
compromise, so Democrats offered a
variation on their previous plan, this
time shifting six additional towns but
reducing the population difference
to one resident, as Republicans had
insisted (Russell 2011a).

The first shoe to drop was the federal
district court ruling on the redistricting
date. On June 9, the three-judge panel
announced that Maine had to resolve
the population inequity between the
districts prior to the 2012 election
(Canfield 2011). In order to have a map
in place by the date candidates could
file for the 2012 primaries, the court
required the state legislature to enact
its plan by September 30, and, failing
that, for the state judiciary to approve
a plan no later than November 15. If the
latter date were not met, the federal
court would impose its own plan by
January 1, 2012.

If the presidential election helped to
motivate the Republican strategy, it
also helped to drive the Democratic
response. Protection of their two
incumbents also played a part. Because
the governor would not defend the
state against the lawsuit to move
up the redistricting date, the Maine
Democratic Party filed an intervening
brief in order to avoid a default
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (Kim
2011). Democrats argued that the
population difference was still small
and that the court ought to defer to
the orderly process set out in state
law and used for the three previous
redistrictings. Case law and data were
not on their side, but they hoped for
a cautious court that would defer
judgment to the state.

Maine Republicans wanted to arrive at
a district map through the legislative
process, where they retained some
control, rather than through state or
federal courts, especially because the
latter would be more likely to approve
a more incremental plan closer to
the one preferred by Democrats. As
Republican legislator and commission
member Ken Fredette said in a party
press release, “The vote that counts
will be the one taken by the Maine
House of Representatives and Senate
during the special legislative session
which is scheduled for September 27,
2011. I would rather the legislature, not
the courts, resolve this.”
The Apportionment Commission
worked on the question over the
summer of 2011, with a public hearing
on August 23. After asking the parties
to offer compromise plans, and seeing
little compromise between them,
Friedman cast the deciding vote on
an otherwise party-line 8-7 decision
in favor of an incremental plan very
close to what the Democrats had
offered (Metzler 2011b). Republicans
immediately reminded the public that
4

F or a recent analysis of plausible scenarios which
could result in an Electoral College tie, see Silver
(2012).
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the consequential vote would be the
one taken by the state legislature and
that the commission recommendation
was merely that.
The legislative process presented its
own hurdle, however. By law, a plan
could be sent to the governor for his
signature only with a 2/3 vote of
both chambers; Republicans, despite
their gains in 2010, were well short of
that threshold in the House and the
Senate. In addition to their inability
to sway Democrats to their plan,
some Republicans most affected by
the plan began to voice concerns
as well. GOP leaders from rural
western Oxford County objected that
they would be moved from the 2nd
district, which was dominated by rural
interests similar to their own, to the
1st district, which would be dominated
by the interests of Portland and other
population centers on the southern
coast of the state (Mistler 2011).
The backlash within the party was
similar to the resistance that prompted
Pennsylvania Republican leaders to
drop their Electoral College plans. In
that case, GOP members of the U.S.
House and the state legislature feared
that their own electoral chances would
be hurt if Democrats, in an effort to
win the district-level electors, invested
heavily in districts they otherwise
would have written off (Hirschhorn
2011). In Maine as in Pennsylvania,
local self-interest by party members
induced the party to walk back a bold
plan to redraw the state’s electoral
landscape.
In response to the dwindling prospects
for their plan via the standard process,
some Republicans in the legislature
floated the possibility of structuring a
vote such that it would require only a
simple majority, noting that Democrats
had pulled similar procedural
maneuvers in the past on measures

ostensibly requiring a supermajority.
Legislative leaders quickly rejected
the possibility, and there were two
political reasons for them to do so.
One was a threat that such a move
would precipitate a people’s veto
question on the next statewide ballot,
a procedure that allows Maine voters
to reject legislative acts. Because many
more residents would be switched
under the Republican plan than either
the Democratic alternative or the
commission’s recommendation, GOP
leaders likely did not relish the chance
to sell their more drastic version in an
election. Second, Democrats further
undercut Republican arguments about
the need for a simple majority by
pointing out that GOP leaders earlier in
the year had cosponsored legislation to
change the redistricting date — which
included a supermajority provision
(Russell 2011b).
Acting under pressure from the court,
the commission recommendation,
and Democrats, the Republican-led
legislature adopted an incremental
map (shown in Figure 4) nearly
identical to the commission and
Democratic schemes by a unanimous
vote in the state Senate and with only

three dissenting votes in the House. In
the end, 13 towns in Kennebec County
switched congressional districts,
increasing on net the estimated
number of Republicans in the second
district by about 2,500 voters (Russell
2011c). The governor signed the
plan into law a day before the courtimposed deadline. Fourteen months
later, both of Maine’s Democratic
incumbents were easily reelected.
Conclusion

Despite its successes in the 2010
election and the high ambitions which
followed, the Maine Republican Party
was unable to shift the congressional
electoral calculus to any discernible
degree in the first and second
districts. The plan that was adopted
was incremental and served largely
to protect incumbent interests;
the incumbents protected were
Democrats. Legislative authority over
redistricting was conditional both on
implicit approval by the voters via a
possible people’s veto process and on
judicial review. Together with growing
rebellion in their own ranks over a more
dramatic change in the map, these
checks induced the Republicans to
revert to the status quo.
Although the GOP failed to redraw
the map for U.S. House elections, they
succeeded in changing the calendar.
Governor LePage and the Maine
Republicans successfully sued to make
Maine fall in line with the rest of the
country and to have its redistricting
occur in year two after a census rather
than year three. To their chagrin,
however, the change in calendar was
much less valuable in the absence of a
change in the map.

Figure 4: Maine Congressional
Districts, 2012–2020
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Redi strict i ng M a ssac husetts 201 2:
A More Open Process, a More Rational Map, and No Indictments
Robert G. Boatright 1, Nicholas M. Giner 2, James R. Gomes 3
It is generally assumed by political
scientists that the primary goal of
redistricting is partisan advantage.
In states where one party controls
the process, it will seek to maximize
the number of congressional seats it
holds either by packing members of
the opposing party into a very small
number of districts or by diluting
opposition party representation by
dispersing pockets of that party’s
supporters among a number of
districts.4 We have few theoretical
guideposts, however, for looking at
states such as Massachusetts — a
state heavily enough Democratic that
there are few ways in which one could
draw districts that would reliably elect
even a single Republican. Although we
cannot yet know how Republicans will
fare in Massachusetts’ new districts
over the coming years, it is clear that
the Massachusetts legislature has a
somewhat different set of incentives
from most other American legislatures.
In our contribution to this volume we
seek to explore these “second order”
incentives. There are at least four such
incentives that we argue are at play
here. First, state legislators (and, in
this case, state legislative committees)
may seek to establish a reputation
for performing the redistricting
task well. The 2002 Massachusetts
redistricting was widely viewed as a
messy, undemocratic process in which
personal grudges played a greater
role than normative concerns. The
committee, and particularly the state
senator and representative who cochaired it, had an incentive to perform
in a way that would garner favorable
media coverage and the respect and
approval of the portion of the public,
admittedly small, that pays attention
to such matters. Second, personal
relationships between legislators and
members of Congress may determine
redistricting’s winners

and losers. Because Massachusetts
lost a seat, it was clear that at least
two members of Congress would be
very unhappy. Although legislators may
develop relationships with members
of Congress — through shared
advocacy for federal projects or simply
through joint campaigning — not all
members of Congress will have clout
with the redistricting committee. As
of 2010 Massachusetts had several
members of Congress who serve on
powerful committees, but only five
of the ten House members as of 2011
had previously served in the state
legislature.5 Third, legislators may
seek to bolster the clout in Congress
of particular regions of the state.
Redistricting may thus be, in part,
a process of evaluating the claims
of different regions and discerning
which cities will dominate the politics
of individual districts. And fourth,
state legislators may want to lay the
groundwork for their own potential
future runs for Congress by creating
districts favorable to them. Advances
in mapmaking technology — and in the
availability of this technology to the
public — made pursuing these goals
easier for legislators, but (perhaps
more importantly) these advances
also gave the public a greater role in
monitoring and participating in the
process than had been the case in
past years.
There is ultimately no way to go
behind closed doors (and, despite
the openness of the process this year,
the doors are still closed during the
crucial committee deliberations) to
find out why districts were drawn
as they are. It seems evident to us,
however, that the political logic of
the 2012 Massachusetts redistricting
was shaped by factors such as those
above. How else can one explain the
radically different nature of the 2012
redistricting as compared to that

of 2002, the fact that the resulting
House districts arguably helped the
Republican party more than they
helped the Democratic Party, or the
fact that the districts have, thus far,
met with almost universal acclaim
from everyone except the state’s
congressional delegation? Below we
explain the circumstances surrounding
these changes in Massachusetts’
redistricting in light of our assumptions
about what went on in the minds of
those who actually drew the maps.
A R ec e n t H i sto ry
of Redistricting in
Massachusetts

Massachusetts is, by many measures,
among the most Democratic states in
the United States. Despite Republican
gains elsewhere in the country in 2010,
the state re-elected its Democratic
Governor, Deval Patrick, and all ten
of its Democratic members of the
House of Representatives. As of 2011
the state’s House of Representatives
contained 128 Democrats and 32
Republicans, and the State Senate had
36 Democrats and four Republicans.
Republicans have at times been
successful at the state level, as the
2010 special election victory of
Scott Brown and the gubernatorial
victories during the 1990s and 2000s
of William Weld, Paul Cellucci, and
Mitt Romney show, and the state
1
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435 members of the House previously served as state
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congressional delegation did include
several Republicans during the 1980s
and 1990s. While it would be difficult
to draw a district that would be likely to
elect a Republican, it might be possible
at the least to draw districts where
Republicans would be competitive.
State legislators have, however, never
tried this, due no doubt to the perennial
overwhelming Democratic majorities in
both houses of the state legislature.
More consequentially, Massachusetts
has also been losing population relative
to the rest of the United States for the
past several decades. Massachusetts
lost a House seat in 1982 and 1992
redistrictings, and it lost another in
this most recent redistricting, dropping
from ten to nine seats. In the 2012
redistricting there was much reference
in the media to communities of
interest — some regions of the state
have historically had their own seats,
but population decline has made it
clear that there are more communities
and regions that believe themselves
entitled to their own seat than there
are seats.
At the time the 2012 redistricting
process began, none of the state’s
ten incumbent House members had
announced a decision to retire or to
run for higher office. The redistricting
math, then, was simple. At minimum,
the districts would need to change
such that at least two current House
members were placed in the same
district. The “winners” and “losers”
in the process would be individual
incumbents or particular regions, not
Democrats or Republicans. Given
that some of the state’s existing
districts looked to be oddly shaped,
and that one area of the state that
seemed reasonably coherent — the
southeastern region along Buzzards
Bay — had been chopped up among
three congressional districts, a
redistricting plan that prioritized

compactness or communities of
interest might well place more than
two legislators in competition with
each other.
Absent the overriding imperative to
maximize Democratic seats, then,
redistricting in Massachusetts has
caused a variety of problems as
legislators have used the process to
reward friends and punish enemies.
Governors have had a minimal role
in redistricting over the past three
cycles; in 1992 the Republican Party
did have sufficient numbers in the
state Senate to sustain a veto by
Republican Governor William Weld,
and the map that resulted from that
round did, in fact, produce Republican
victories, albeit short-lived ones, in two
of the state’s ten districts. In the 2002
redistricting Republican Governor Jane
Swift6 appears not to have played a
role, and in 2012 Democratic Governor
Deval Patrick could conceivably have
vetoed a plan, although this veto
would not have taken place on partisan
grounds. In the 2002 redistricting
then-state House of Representatives
Speaker Thomas Finneran initially
pushed the redistricting committee to
carve up the district of one member
of Congress he disliked, even though
Massachusetts was not losing a seat
in that year’s redistricting.7 Despite
the fact that state law specifies
that redistricting shall be overseen
by a joint committee composed of
state House and Senate members,
Finneran, as House speaker, sought
to preempt the joint committee’s
proceedings by introducing his own
proposal. Finneran’s gambit was that
his evisceration of the Rep. Martin
Meehan’s Lowell-based district would
be overshadowed by the creation of
a majority-minority district. Meehan
ultimately sought and received
the backing of both of the state’s
(Democratic) U.S. senators, as well as

the state’s (Republican) governor. The
Senate President, in response to the
pushback against Finneran, announced
that the senate, unlike Finneran,
would take incumbency into account
and avoid pitting House members
against each other. A gerrymandered
incumbent protection map, with oddly
shaped North-to-South districts in
the Southeasten part of the state
(but which still included the majorityminority district proposed by Finneran),
resulted. Finneran, meanwhile, ran
into further trouble regarding the state
legislative redistricting plan, which
also appeared to play out political
vendettas, was introduced so close
to the state-mandated deadline that
there was little public scrutiny, and
was not as friendly to minorities as the
congressional proposal. Finneran pled
guilty to obstruction of justice in 2007
for his false and misleading testimony
in a suit filed in 2003 regarding the
legislative redistricting.
In short, the 2002 redistricting was
a complete disaster in terms of the
process, public perceptions of the
process, and the resulting maps. At
a minimum, it provided a lesson for
future legislators on what not to do.
Massachusetts
R e d i s t r i c t i n g L aw
and Process

Massachusetts state law specifies
that a Joint Special Committee
on Redistricting is to be created
following the decennial census, and
this committee is then to present its
plan to the state House and Senate
6

 wift, a Republican elected Lieutenant Governor
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in 1998, became Governor in April of 2001 when
Governor Paul Cellucci resigned.

7

 good summary of the 2000 redistricting is provided
A
in Moscardelli (2002). Much of the discussion in
this paragraph summarizes issues raised in the
Moscardelli piece.
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Consequences of the New
R e d i s t r i c t i n g Pl a n

The joint committee released its
proposed congressional map on
November 7, 2011. Figure 1 shows
the 2002 and 2012 maps, and Table
1 shows the relationship between
the geographic areas covered by
the 2002 districts and those of the
2012 map.11 Below, we describe the
districting changes with reference to
the criteria we expect would be of
the most concern to politicians and
Massachusetts citizens.

Figure 1: Massachusetts Congressional Districts, 2002-2010

for approval.8 The governor has veto
power over the eventual legislation, but
his or her veto can be overridden. The
2011 act establishing the committee
stated that the committee should
consist of seven senators appointed
by the Senate president, one of whom
must be a member of the minority
party, and 21 representatives appointed
by the speaker, of whom four must
be members of the minority party.
Republicans, then, were represented on
the committee in rough proportion to
their presence in the legislature.
There are legal and geographic
constraints on the process — the state
contains sufficient, and sufficiently
concentrated, minority population to
construct one majority-minority district
(this district was 51.4 percent minority
as of the 2000 census9), and in places
(notably the Cape Cod area) the
state’s geography and borders limit the
creativity of line-drawers. As in most
other states, there are also informal
constraints, including addressing the
needs and desires of different regions
and, to the extent possible, avoiding
dividing cities and towns.

Perhaps the most important
informal constraint on the process,
however, was a sentiment that the
joint committee should not repeat
the controversy of 2002. The bad
aftertaste left by that redistricting
may have prompted the legislature
to open up the process in 2011;
the Joint Committee scheduled 14
public hearings throughout the state.
The Joint Committee also set up a
website that contained summaries
of Massachusetts redistricting laws,
court cases related to redistricting
(both at the state and federal level),
past district maps, and links to public
mapping programs.10 The site listed the
committee members and the public
hearing dates, and after the public
hearings had been completed, videos
of these meetings were included.
The committee also promised, and
delivered, a two-week comment period
between the release of proposed
legislative and congressional maps and
the state House vote on these maps.
In the previous round of redistricting,
the maps were released on a Thursday
and voted upon on a Monday (see
Brown 2011).

Changes from the Prior Districts:
As Table 1 shows, five of the nine
new districts have retained more
than 80 percent of the land area of
prior districts. One major change in
the map was the combination of the
state’s two Western districts into
one district, based in Springfield. The
removal of this district resulted in
the prior Springfield-based district
shedding much of its territory in the
central Southern part of the state,
leading to a more compact district
in the central part of the state. The
central, Worcester-based district, in
turn, lost a narrow corridor that had
previously snaked from Worcester
toward the Southeastern industrial city
of Fall River. This change facilitated a
second major alteration in the state’s
districts, as the Cape Cod district
became more compact, losing the
Boston-area suburb of Quincy and
gaining the Buzzards Bay city of New

8

F or a full summary of Massachusetts redistricting
laws, see http://www.malegislature.gov/District/Laws.

9

 his district, MA-8, has since its creation been
T
represented by a white Democrat, Michael Capuano.

10

See http://www.malegislature.gov/District.

11

 e provide data for shifts in territorial area here
W
instead of population because geography remains
static from one redistricting to the next while
population shifts across decades. Some of the
effects of population shift are addressed below in our
discussion of changes in partisanship.
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2012 Congressional Districts
2002
Congressional
Districts

District 1

District 2

District 3

District 4

District 5

District 6

District 7

District 8

District 9

District 1

59.17

32.43

8.40

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

District 2

53.74

42.47

0.00

3.78

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

District 3

0.00

45.34

4.87

40.57

7.86

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.36

District 4

0.00

0.00

0.00

46.61

2.12

0.00

0.00

1.29

49.97

District 5

0.00

0.01

84.11

0.00

6.24

9.64

0.00

0.00

0.00

District 6

0.00

0.00

0.03

0.00

0.04

99.94

0.00

0.00

0.00

District 7

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.09

97.87

0.05

1.99

0.00

0.00

District 8

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.11

8.81

0.00

87.96

3.12

0.00

District 9

0.00

0.00

0.00

17.70

0.00

0.00

7.46

70.92

3.92

District 10

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

10.02

89.98

Total

112.91

120.25

97.41

108.85

122.95

109.62

97.41

85.36

145.24

Table 1: Changes in Territory of Massachusetts Congressional Districts, 2002-2012

Bedford and part of Fall River. The
remainder of Fall River is now in the
new 4th District, which had previously
contained New Bedford but now takes
in more territory along the border of
Rhode Island. Although the territorial
changes in the South Shore area of
the state are less dramatic than those
in the Central and Western parts of
the state, the movement of several
medium-sized industrial cities has
greater ramifications in terms of shifts

of actual voters and in terms of the
partisanship of these districts.
Incumbents: There was substantial
speculation in the Massachusetts
media about the new congressional
maps for several weeks before they
finally appeared. The proposed state
legislative maps had been released
in mid-October, and at that time
a series of rumors had circulated
about potential changes in the three

Figure 2: Massachusetts Congressional Districts, 2012-2020

congressional districts in Western
and Central Massachusetts and in
the Lowell-based district of Rep. Niki
Tsongas (Phillips 2011a, b; Sutner 2011).
John Olver, who represented a district
including the Berkshires and a long
swath of the northern tier of the state
stretching almost to the Merrimack
Valley, announced his retirement
on October 26, shortly before the
proposed congressional maps were
released but after the publication of
several news articles speculating about
a matchup between Olver and another
incumbent (either Springfield’s Richard
Neal or Worcester’s James McGovern).
The final map would have indeed
forced Olver to run against another
incumbent (McGovern), but it did not
in fact look much like those rumored
to be under consideration before
Olver announced his resignation.
In the Eastern part of the state, the
residences of Representatives Steven
Lynch and William Keating were drawn
into the same district, a problem
Keating addressed by choosing to run
in the new Cape Cod district where
he had a summer home, a district
containing much of the territory of his
old district, with the notable exception
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District 2012
(Incumbent)

1 (Neal)

Incumbent’s
District
2002

Pct.
Democratic
2012

Pct.
Democratic
2002

Pct.
Republican
2012

Pct.
Republican
2002

Pct.
Unenrolled
2012

Pct.
Unenrolled
2002

Pct.
Nonwhite
2012

Pct.
Nonwhite
2002

2

37.31

35.97

13.29

13.23

49.40

50.79

17.53

17.12

2 (McGovern)

3

33.15

33.49

12.54

13.30

54.31

53.21

14.79

16.19

3 (Tsongas)

5

33.40

33.49

13.36

13.30

53.24

53.21

21.52

16.19

4 (Open / Frank)

4

33.41

38.32

13.11

11.32

53.49

50.36

11.00

13.60

5 (Markey)

7

40.60

34.00

10.66

13.27

48.74

52.72

20.65

21.68

6 (Tierney)

6

31.43

31.33

13.32

13.40

55.25

55.27

12.02

12.46

7 (Capuano)

8

55.57

56.33

6.71

6.78

37.72

36.89

48.94

45.52

8 (Lynch)

9

40.02

41.32

11.68

11.07

48.30

47.62

20.44

25.76

10

32.31

29.99

14.27

15.67

53.42

54.34

9.44

10.30

9 (Keating)

Table 2: District Changes in Partisanship and Race

Note: Partisanship data for both redistricting plans are taken from voter registration in the 2008 election. Race data from the 2000 census.

of Quincy, his place of residence and
the old district’s largest city (Phillips
and Bierman 2011). And Representative
Barney Frank announced his retirement
after the redistricting; he did not cite
redistricting as a primary reason for his
decision, but he did hint that he was
retiring a cycle sooner than he would
have liked because of his concerns
about introducing himself to so many
new constituents (Richmond 2011).
Had he run, he may well have faced
a more difficult reelection contest in
2012 than he had faced in previous
years, although the larger turnout we
can expect in a presidential election
year would likely have aided any
Democratic candidate.
The final map, then, ultimately
produced one open seat and no
incumbent vs. incumbent matchups,
but it clearly is not an incumbent
protection gerrymander. Some
incumbents were safer than before,
including Representatives Tsongas
and McGovern, both of whom
maintained their urban bases while
shedding some Republican-leaning
rural and suburban areas. However,
their security came at a cost of taking
on many new constituents. The new

1st district appears likely to remain
Democratic for the near future, but
the combination of his home city
of Springfield with the Berkshires
provided the incumbent, Richard
Neal, with a somewhat competitive
primary challenger. The state’s most
competitive race in 2012, however,
was the new 6th district, on the state’s
North Shore. This district changed
little, but ethical issues involving the
district’s incumbent representative,
John Tierney,12 led to a challenge from a
prominent centrist Republican, Richard
Tisei, and the National Republican
Campaign Committee and various
conservative Super PACs spent heavily
on the race (Isenstadt 2011). Although
Tisei led in several late polls, Tierney
eked out a narrow victory. Barney
Frank’s retirement appeared at first to
have the potential to set off a heated
Democratic primary, and Frank’s Tea
Party-inspired 2010 opponent, Sean
Bielat, again sought the Republican
nomination. However, the entry of
Joseph Kennedy III, son of former
Representative Joseph Kennedy II and
grandson of Robert Kennedy, reduced
competition on the Democratic side
and erased Republican expectations of
winning this seat.

Partisanship: Table 2 shows changes
in the partisan and racial composition
of Massachusetts’ districts following
the 2012 redistricting. This table
compares each of the incumbents’
current and former districts, assuming
that if Barney Frank had remained in
Congress he would have run in the new
4th district. While it may oversimplify
matters somewhat to argue that, for
instance, the old 2nd district “became”
the new 1st district, the data we
showed in Table 1 clearly demonstrated
that each of the incumbents who
sought to remain in Congress chose
to run in the new district that most
resembled his or her prior district.
The partisanship data here, drawn
from 2008 voter registration records,
show how little Massachusetts’
districts changed in their partisanship.
Whether one considers Democratic
registration, Republican registration,
or registration as unenrolled, it is clear
that mapmakers sought to change the
current districts as little as possible

12

 ep. Tierney’s wife pled guilty to aiding and abetting
R
the filing of false tax returns by her brother and served
30 days in prison.
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in terms of their partisanship.13 Two
districts — those of Reps. Markey
and Keating — became slightly more
Democratic, and one district, formerly
held by Rep. Frank, became slightly less
Democratic. The partisanship changes
in the districts of Keating and Frank
are a consequence of the movement
of the larger cities of New Bedford and
part of Fall River from the 4th to the
9th districts; the change in Markey’s
district is a result of the movement
of some of the northern towns in
Frank’s district to Markey’s. The large
number of unenrolled voters in each
of these districts makes it difficult to
predict what might take place in future
elections, but it is clear that there
is only one district (the 4th) where
Republicans were arguably advantaged
by the redistricting.
Race: Massachusetts continues to
have one district that is nearly a
majority-minority district; this district
does reach that level if one sums the
percentage of African-Americans,
Asians, and Latinos (who may also
identify themselves as white on the
census). This district became slightly
less white in the 2010 redistricting,
although it appears that it will
continue to have a white incumbent.
It is technically possible to draw this
district in a manner that includes more
minorities — in fact, it is possible, if one
draws districts very creatively, to draw
two Massachusetts districts that are
majority-minority — but doing so has
never been a priority of the legislature
or of voting rights organizations.
Major cities: The new, nine district
map contains no fewer than seven
districts that are either centered
around a major municipality (the 1st,
2nd and 3rd are centered, respectively,
around Springfield, Worcester, and
Lowell), a well-recognized regional
community of interest (the 5th, 6th,

and 9th are centered around the
Metrowest area, the North Shore, and
the Cape and Islands, or a “majorityminority” concentration of people of
color (the 7th includes the urban and
heavily minority communities in and
near Boston). Only the 4th and 8th
appear to have been constructed based
on population remnants, i.e., who and
where was left over after accounting
for the cities and communities listed
above.
Compactness: Scholars have longsince concluded that there are no
generally preferable ways to measure
the compactness of districts.14
However, it is not going too far out
on a limb to assert that the 2012 map
represents a significant stride forward,
in terms of compactness, from the
2002 map. Both the western and
southeastern parts of the state are
divided more neatly and compactly
than previously. The differences in the
southeast are especially noticeable, as
a region that had previously been sliced
and diced among three districts has
now been neatly cut in two. Although
there is no way to be certain about the
intentions of legislators, it appears that
the notions of communities of interest
and compactness won out in this round
over incumbent protection, but without
much, if any, harm to what is perhaps
the paramount concern: protecting
the interest of the majority party
Democrats.
A More Open Process?

The joint committee on redistricting
certainly sought to make information
on the redistricting process visible to
the public. It is difficult to make firm
connections between citizens’ ideas
about redistricting and the maps that
were ultimately developed by the
committee. Because the maps are

arguably more compact than previous
districts; because they do not appear
to be blatantly pro-incumbent; because
there are arguably more competitive
districts than were produced in 2002;
and because the maps remedy some
long-standing complaints about
communities of interest (particularly
in Southeastern Massachusetts) it
appears that the committee did seek
to produce “fair” results and did, in
fact, act upon some of the testimony
it received. Although the committee
invited testimony, both in writing and
during the public hearings, its website
does not include the written testimony
that it received.
Redistricting proposals from outside
the legislature can be grouped into
three categories. First, local media
throughout the state published pieces
about ensuring representation of
their regions but did not endorse
comprehensive plans. Newspapers
in the Berkshires (at the western
end of the state) argued that they
were different from residents of
Springfield (the largest city in Western
Massachusetts) and should thus have
their own district (Davis 2011); political
leaders in Worcester argued that
they were different from residents of
Springfield or Lowell (Monahan 2011);
and editorial pages on the state’s North
Shore, as well, argued that they were
different from their neighbors and
should not be grouped with Lowell or
Lawrence (Newburyport News 2011).
13

 assachusetts allows citizens to register as
M
“unenrolled” — essentially, to proclaim themselves
to be independents. These voters are permitted to
request the ballot of any party in a primary election
without changing their registration status. The
allegiances of unenrolled voters are a subject of
frequent discussion in Massachusetts politics. Given
the anemic Republican registration totals (as shown in
Table 2), unenrolled voters are generally crucial to the
success of statewide Republican candidates.

14

See generally Monmonier, pp. 64-76.
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Testimony at the public hearings often
followed this model; at the Worcester
hearing, for instance, it appeared to
us that there was an organized effort
afoot to ensure that Worcester and
Springfield were not placed in the
same district and that the region west
of the Boston metropolitan area have
three districts. Republicans on the joint
committee also often adopted this
sort of argument — a convenient one
for them, perhaps, since preserving
three districts in an area of the state
with only two major cities would have
had the effect of creating at least one
largely rural, and somewhat more
Republican-leaning, district.
Second, an organization called Fair
Districts Massachusetts (FDM), led by
former Republican Senate candidate
Jack E. Robinson and advised by
Republican State Representative Daniel
Winslow, released two proposed
maps that would have had more
compact districts and would arguably
have increased competitiveness
in Boston’s southern and western
suburbs. These maps also substantially
increased the minority population in
the state’s majority-minority district.
Although FDM asserted that this was
a nonpartisan effort, it claimed that its
proposal had pushed Frank and Olver
towards retirement, an argument made
prominently enough on the group’s
website; one cannot but assume that
it took pride in its role in ending the
career of the liberal icon Frank in
particular. FDM endorsed the state’s
final maps and stated that its advocacy
had guided the committee’s decisionmaking.15
Third, the New Democracy Coalition,
a coalition of organizations on the left,
also argued for the enhancement of
the state’s majority-minority district.
The Massachusetts NAACP and

MassVote, an organization that also
advocates for increased representation
for minorities, jointly developed two
different proposed maps that would
have also increased the population
of this district, but these maps did
less to increase the competiveness of
other districts than did the FDM maps.
These groups also issued a statement
approving of the committee’s process.16
Common Cause Massachusetts did
not explicitly endorse any of these
proposals but it did argue for increasing
the transparency of the redistricting
process (as compared with the 2002
procedure) and commended the
committee for allowing a two week
comment period after the release of
the proposed maps.17 The national
office of Common Cause issues report
cards for the state on various matters
of open government; although it
gave Massachusetts a “C” overall, it
gave it an “A” for the openness of its
redistricting.18 These groups and FDM
both found an unlikely ally in April 2011
as Senator Scott Brown announced
his support for empowering minorities
(although Brown did not endorse any
particular plan; see Emery 2011).
An interesting aspect of this round
of redistricting in Massachusetts
was the role of State Senator Stan
Rosenberg (D-Amherst), the Senate
chair of the Special Joint Committee
on Redistricting. Rosenberg is a
long-time member of the senate who
had been mentioned as a possible
successor to 1st District Congressman
(and fellow Amherst resident) John
Olver. In his own political interest,
Rosenberg might well have wanted
to keep Amherst together in a district
with Berkshire County and separate
from both Springfield and Worcester.
But the loss of population in the
western counties compared to the
rest of the state would have required

stretching the old 1st (Berkshires) and
2nd (Metro Springfield) districts even
farther east, sandwiching but avoiding
Worcester (the hub of the old 3rd
Distrtict). Such a configuration might
also have complicated the redrawing
of the district that is home to the
delegation’s lone female member, Rep.
Niki Tsongas. It may be that creating
a favorable district for a future run by
Stan Rosenberg would have required
gerrymandering so obvious and bizarre
as to be politically untenable, at least in
the current climate.
Overall, then, it appears that citizen
groups found much to like in the
process, and that the only losers
were residents of the Berkshires and,
arguably, some of the incumbent
representatives. The committee
clearly sought to encourage public
feedback and to provide citizens with
the necessary tools with which to
draw their own conclusions about the
procedure. In our opinion, the process
in Massachusetts was as open, if not
more so, than it was in any of the other
states we looked at. It is not at all clear
that the committee took the various
outside proposals into account (but
then, how would one tell one way or
the other?).
15

 ee http://fairdistrictsmass.org/FDMPressRelease.
S
pdf.

16

 ee http://massvote.org/2011/11/new-congressionalS
maps-give-you-more-power/.

17

http://www.commoncause.org/siteapps/advocacy/
ActionItem.aspx?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=7809089.
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 ee http://www.commoncause.org/site/
S
pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4847587. Common
Cause certainly is not susceptible to grade inflation;
Massachusetts’ overall “C” grade was the tenthhighest among the states.
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O u t lo o k fo r F u t u r e
Redistricting Reforms

What accounts for this change
in the politics of redistricting in
Massachusetts? We have already
discussed two factors, the loss of a
congressional seat that necessitated
substantial redrawing of lines and
the recent history of scandal that
arguably set the bar higher for
ethical conduct. A third factor, the
much greater availability of mapping
software and data, may have been the
most important reason the legislature
produced the eventual 2012 map.
In earlier decennial redistrictings,
mapping software was more expensive,
less widely available, and harder to use.
By the 2012 round, however, programs
such as Dave’s Redistricting19 were
available to anyone with a personal
computer. A modicum of skills,
patience, and the inclination to try
one’s hand at map-making were all that
was required to duplicate the process
that heretofore had been confined
to closed-door rooms at the State
House. The website of the Joint Special
Committee on Redistricting even had
its own “Draw Your Own Districts”
link,20 something that surely never
occurred to former Speaker Finneran.
Before the legislature began its work
on new district maps, Massachusetts
Secretary of State William Galvin,
the commonwealth’s chief elections
official — and a former state
legislator — had publicly called for a
new independent commission to draw
district lines.21 His proposal was quickly
shot down by State Senate President
Therese Murray (D-Plymouth), and
the near-universal praise for the results
reached by the legislature in this round
of redistricting will no doubt be offered
as evidence a decade from now that
the elected politicians are clearly
capable of doing the job.

Another factor worthy of note was
that Democrats had lost their majority
in the U.S. House of Representatives
during the 2010 midterm elections. Had
Democrats remained in the majority in
Washington, the state legislature may
well have thought better of creating
districts that disadvantaged long-time
powerful incumbents like Frank and
Olver. There is, of course, no way of
knowing how this might have played
out, although, at least in the case of
Frank, maintaining the thin, north-tosouth gerrymander of southeastern
Massachusetts that, inter alia, provided
Frank with reliable nests of Democratic
voters in both the north (Newton and
Brookline) and south (New Bedford and
part of Fall River) of his district might
have been hard to resist.
To close with a hoary cliché, ten
years is a very long time in politics,
so it is hard to predict the historical
legacy of Massachusetts’ 2012
redistricting. Population projections
for the 2020s make it appear
unlikely that Massachusetts will
lose another seat in ten years, so the
calculus for legislators will no doubt
be different in 2022. It seems more
likely that a Republican will win one of
Massachusetts’ congressional seats in
the coming decade than it is that the
Massachusetts legislature will become
substantially more Republican, so
it may well be that partisanship will
play a greater role in the future than it
has this year. The legacy of the 2002
redistricting, however, clearly weighed
on Massachusetts legislators as they
approached the mapmaking process
in 2012. If the early reviews of this
year’s redistricting are any indication,
legislators will have less to prove in the
future than they did this year.
19

http://gardow.com/davebradlee/redistricting/
launchapp.html
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http://www.malegislature.gov/District/
CreateDistricts
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New H am p s hi r e ’s Co ngr e ssi on al Red i str i cti n g
Dante J. Scala*

With only two congressional districts
to draw and minimal changes required,
the state of New Hampshire had
one of the easiest redistricting tasks
in the union after the 2010 Census.
The final result barely shifted the
contours of the two districts. Why,
then, did the process itself take so
long? New Hampshire was next to
last in completing the task, with
Governor John Lynch signing off on
the new map on April 23 (Wichita
Eagle 2012). The answer, in short,
was that the process was left to the
congressmen themselves. To be more
specific, a simple job on paper became
a more complicated zero-sum game
for the two Republican incumbents,
both of whom won their seats in the
Republican avalanche of 2010. Now
facing tough races to keep their seats
during a presidential election year,
both incumbents hoped to enhance
their chances in their swing districts
by squeezing out possible advantages
in the redistricting process. The result,
predictably enough, was a standoff that ultimately yielded few net
positives for either congressman.
A R ec e n t H i sto ry o f
N e w H a m p s hi r e ’ s
C o n g r e s s i o n a l Di s t r i c t s

The Granite State has possessed two
congressional districts since 1882.
The districts are divided by a single
boundary line that runs roughly
north-south, splitting the state into
the eastern First Congressional
District bordering Maine, and the
western Second Congressional District
bordering Vermont. The First District
is geographically the more compact
of the two, extending from the state’s
largest city of Manchester to the
seacoast; the district includes much
of the voter-rich southern tier, which

now serves as the outermost circle
of Greater Boston and its suburbs.
The Second District extends over a
significantly larger geographical area,
encompassing all of northernmost
Coos County, as well as the three
counties bordering Vermont.
Significantly for Republicans, the
Second District includes a strip of
prosperous towns along the border
with Massachusetts that have
become part of the core Republican
base in New Hampshire. The district
also includes Nashua, the state’s
second-largest city. (Traditionally,
New Hampshire’s two largest cities,
Manchester and Nashua, have each
been allocated to separate districts.)
Since 1992, New Hampshire has shifted
from a strongly Republican state to a
swing state in presidential elections.
The last Republican presidential
candidate to win a majority of the
state’s vote was George H. W. Bush
in 1988; his son carried the state in
2000 with only a plurality of the vote.
In 2004, New Hampshire was the
only state to shift from Republican to
Democratic, casting its four electoral
votes for Senator John Kerry from
neighboring Massachusetts; in 2008,
Barack Obama easily carried the
state over John McCain, who won the
state’s heralded first-in-the-nation
Republican presidential primary in
2000 and 2008. The bellwether nature
of the Granite State has been reflected
in recent elections in the state’s two
congressional districts.
The First Congressional District is a
true bellwether, with a Partisan Voting
Index (PVI) of R+0. Three different
politicians have occupied the seat
since 2006. In that year, little-known
progressive activist Carol Shea-Porter
captured the Democratic nomination,
and then pulled off one of the biggest
upsets of the cycle in upending

Republican incumbent Jeb Bradley. Two
years later, Shea-Porter successfully
fended off Bradley’s attempt to regain
his seat. 2010, however, was a far less
friendly environment than the previous
two cycles for the Democrat, and
Shea-Porter was easily pushed aside
by former Manchester Mayor Frank
Guinta.
The Second Congressional District
has acquired a distinct Democratic
tilt, currently possessing a PVI of
D + 3. In the Second Congressional
District, Republican Charlie Bass had
held the seat since the “Republican
Revolution” of 1994. The Democratic
wave of 2006, however, carried him
out of office. Four years later, when
his successor, Paul Hodes, decided to
run for the U. S. Senate seat vacated
by Republican incumbent Judd Gregg,
Bass attempted to regain his old
seat. Facing Ann McLane Kuster, a
Democratic newcomer with formidable
fundraising strength, Bass nonetheless
prevailed, albeit with less than 50
percent of the vote.
Both Guinta and Bass faced
significant challenges in 2012, when
the “enthusiasm gap” in the two
parties’ respective bases narrowed
considerably. Bass was widely
considered to be the more endangered
of the two, but in the end both lost
their seats in the 2012 general election,
Bass by a 50 to 45 percent margin
to Kuster and Guinta by a 50 to 46
percent margin to Shea-Porter. Perhaps
redistricting would have saved one
or the other, but the election shows
little evidence that either candidate
benefitted from redistricting.
*Associate Professor of Political Science, University of
New Hampshire
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Th e R e d i s t r i c t i n g P r o c e s s
i n N e w H a m p s hi r e

New Hampshire’s state legislature,
overwhelmingly Republican after the
2010 elections, was responsible for
redrawing district lines, subject to
the approval of Democratic Governor
John Lynch. In addition to the two
congressional districts, the legislature
also was responsible for drawing five
Executive Council districts and twentyfour State Senate districts; it also faced
the formidable task of allocating the
lower State House’s 400 seats among
the Granite State’s various towns and
cities.
Compared to such work, redrawing the
two Congressional districts appeared
to be a fairly simple task. Population
changes had been undramatic and
relatively uniform across both districts,
and therefore the two districts were
only a few hundred votes shy of being
equal in population. Furthermore,
Republican leadership in the State
House was intent on keeping the
status quo between the two districts.
“For State House leaders, dramatic
change creates unnecessary drama,”
wrote longtime Granite State political
reporter James Pindell last February
(Pindell 2012a).
Given their druthers, both Republican
congressmen most likely would have
preferred to redraw the district lines
in their favor. While Guinta clearly
represented the more conservative
of the two Granite State districts, the
makeup of the First Congressional
District did not offer him a partisan
advantage. It was his colleague Bass,
however, facing an electorate that
clearly leaned Democratic, who
doubtless saw a more urgent need to
shake up the status quo in his favor.
In particular, the Second District
congressman wished to acquire a
number of Republican towns for

his district that would have rid his
electorate of its Democratic tilt. These
towns lay mainly in New Hampshire’s
southern tier. In the 2010 elections, a
small set of voter-rich Massachusetts
border towns stretching across
Hillsborough and Rockingham counties
had proven vital to Bass’s successful
comeback. Bass had long had his
eye on Bedford, a town adjoining
Manchester, which was one of the
most Republican in the state; such
a shift was viewed as infeasible,
though, because of the town’s historic
connection with the adjoining city.
In the end, Bass proposed a swap of
northern towns (including the college
town of Plymouth) for Republicantilting areas such as Merrimack,
Plaistow, Hampstead, and Kingston.
This would have left Bass in a slightly
better position, at the expense of
his colleague in the neighboring
district. Bass argued that making
his district slightly more Republican
was in the long-term interests of
the New Hampshire GOP. While the
congressman, who turned 60 this
year, described himself as a “shorttermer” in office, the benefits of such
redistricting would accrue to the fellow
party member who attempted to
succeed him. Bass’s plans beyond the
2012 election, however, were unclear.1
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Figure 1: New Hampshire Congressional
Districts 2002-2010

Guinta, who turned 42 in 2012 and
thus had reason to anticipate a longer
congressional career than Bass,
saw little merit in his colleague’s
plan. In addition, some lawmakers
from affected towns also objected
to the changes. The First District
congressman suggested a simpler fix:
move exactly one town, Waterville
1

 ee DiStaso 2012a, Pindell 2012a. Bass’s proposal
S
apparently never gained traction among fellow
Republicans in the State House. In fact, a House
subcommittee on redistricting put forth a proposal
that would make Bass’s district lean slightly more
Democratic (Tucker 2012).

Figure 2: New Hampshire Congressional
Districts 2012-2020
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Valley, in order to address the small
population imbalance (DiStaso 2012a).
This minimalist approach won the
approval of State House leadership,
including Speaker of the House Bill
O’Brien. In mid-March, a House
committee voted 14-1 to approve a
plan O’Brien co-sponsored, which
moved Waterville Valley and Sargent’s
Purchase into the First District.
Combined, the changes affected a
mere 250 people (DiStaso 2012b).

district a distinctive Republican
tilt for the next decade. In all, New
Hampshire’s GOP elected to do no
harm to either incumbent and hope for
the best.

Ultimately, the two Republican
congressmen agreed on a more
expansive set of changes, which helped
Bass’s re-election prospects slightly.
In late March, the two consented to a
plan that swapped six towns, affecting
some 15,000 voters. Figures 1 and 2
show the old and new districting plans.
Bass’s district became slightly less
Democratic-tilting as a result, while
doing negligible harm to Guinta’s reelection prospects (Pindell 2012b).

----. 2012b. “Panel backs Guinta over
Bass in redistricting feud.” The New
Hampshire Union Leader, March 13, pp.
A1, A8.

In sum, during a redistricting session
in which they held almost all the cards
(including a veto-proof majority in the
state legislature), New Hampshire
state legislative leaders deferred
to the wishes of its Republican
congressional incumbents. And when
the two incumbents were unable to
reach an agreement, the Republican
legislative leadership opted for a near
status-quo approach more favored
by Guinta, the congressman with the
more Republican of New Hampshire’s
two districts. A plan that would have
made its Democratic-leaning Second
District more competitive for the
next decade was a non-starter for the
GOP leadership. On the other hand,
New Hampshire’s GOP did not see fit
to strip Bass’s district of Republican
towns, thus giving Guinta’s bellwether
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Redi strict i ng i n R ho de I s l an d : A Zero-Sum Game
Amelia Najjar and Nicholas Rossi*

California comprises 53 districts;
Florida, 27; Texas, 36. Rhode Island has
two. Congressional redistricting in this
small state is somewhat simple when
compared to the above-mentioned
states. However, the Ocean State does
have its fair share of complexities,
which made for a stirring and
enthralling redrawing of districts during
the 2010-12 redistricting cycle. This
redistricting was largely characterized
by a political tug of war between the
two Democratic representatives,
David Cicilline (D – District 1) and
Jim Langevin (D – District 2), over
voters in Providence. The media was
quick to highlight speculation that the
redrawing was unevenly benefiting
the districts, helping one politician
more than the other. It is not overly
surprising that those involved in the
process have been accused of playing
politics, since a political body—the
state legislature—holds almost
exclusive power over redistricting; that
is, current state legislators comprise
the commission that redraws district
maps for themselves as well as for
congressional representatives. Rhode
Island experienced minor population
changes that needed to be accounted
for,1 but shifts in district lines were
still largely political, and certainly
contentious.
Redistricting in
Rh o d e I s l a n d

Historically, the districts in Rhode
Island have not tended to change
drastically over the years. There were
three districts until 1933, when the
state’s slow population growth relative
to the rest of the country led to the
loss of one district. Since then, Rhode
Island has seen two districts cutting
up the state in an east-west divide.
Redistricting in Rhode Island has

generally not been aimed at severely
altering the districts in terms of shape
and communities of interest; it has
mainly been about shifting certain
voters along the boundary lines to
change the makeup or demographic
of the district just enough to achieve a
particular result. 2010 was no different.
While the criteria for redistricting
are essentially the same across the
nation, how it is carried out can
vary considerably, depending on the
geography, demographics, history,
and political atmosphere of each
state. On June 22, 2011, Governor
Lincoln Chafee signed into law Bills H
6096 and S 924, creating an advisory
commission to redraw state legislative
and congressional districts based on
the 2010 census (Levitt 2013). This
advisory commission consisted of
18 members: four representatives
appointed by the House speaker, two
representatives appointed by the
House minority leader, four senators
appointed by the Senate president,
two senators appointed by the Senate
minority leader, three members of the
public appointed by the House speaker
and three members of the public
appointed by the Senate president.
For the 2010 cycle, there were seven
Democrats and five Republicans on
the commission (excluding the public
members). The six public members
tended to be somewhat politically
active, be it on a town planning or
zoning board, as the chairman of
a town political committee or as a
former state politician. Some public
members also had experience as small
business owners, government workers,
or as workers in the private sector (“A
Breakdown” 2011).
The advisory commission conducted
a series of public hearings, in which
members of the public could hear

from the commission members and
the commission members could
hear testimony from members of the
community. Groups such as Common
Cause, the Rhode Island League of
Women Voters, the Urban League
of Rhode Island, the Providence
Branch of the NAACP, the American
Civil Liberties Union, and various
newspapers frequented the meetings
held by the commission (“Rhode
Island Redistricting Project”). Average
citizens, however, do not attend public
hearings, so the media therefore played
a major role in informing the public
about these hearings.
The political makeup of a state is an
important determinant of how the
redistricting process will pan out.
In recent years Rhode Island has
become increasingly Democratic. It is
the fourth bluest state in the nation,
with 40.9 percent of voting Rhode
Islanders registered as Democrats,
while only 10.4 percent are registered
as Republicans (“Gemma” 2010). In
the 2012 presidential election, Rhode
Island voters cast 67.2 percent of their
votes for Barack Obama (“2012 Rhode
Island Presidential Results”). It is
clear that in Rhode Island competition
occurs mostly among politicians to the
left of center fighting to ensure they are
chosen to represent their demographic,
rather than among opposing parties.
The northern and western parts of the
state, however, do tend to be more
conservative than the rest of the state
and can occasionally pose a threat to
the Democratic establishment.

1

 ll states must adhere to the 14th Amendment Equal
A
Protection Clause-based requirement that all districts
within a state be as close to equal in population as
possible. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US 1 (1964).
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Additionally, with 48.6 percent of
voters registered as Independents,
Rhode Island is a state in which
independent/unaffiliated voters
can easily sway elections (Cohen
2012). This may explain why Rhode
Island has not elected a Democratic
governor since 1992. In 2010, while
Democrats had the upper hand in
their congressional general election
contests, both Democrats campaigned
aggressively. In the 2010 congressional
election in District 2, Jim Langevin
won 59.9 percent of the vote, to his
Republican opponent Mark Zaccaria’s
31.8 percent; however, in the open
seat race in District 1, David Cicilline
only won 50.6 percent of the vote
to Republican John Loughlin’s
44.6 percent (Cohen 2012). While
incumbents are always interested in
redistricting making their seats as safe
as possible, given the narrow 2010
margin in District 1, in 2012 Cicilline
in particular had a strong interest in
the redistricting process, resulting in a
more Democratic-leaning district.
Rhode Island is not only a distinctly
blue state — it is also the smallest state
in the nation in terms of geography. It
does, however, manage to satisfy the
population requirements for having
two districts. Rhode Island’s two
districts, each somewhere slightly
above 500,000 people, are smaller
than most of the country’s districts,
which average approximately 700,000
people (Nesi 2011). There was early
speculation that R.I. would become a
single district state, since it was one
of the slowest growing populations in
the country between 2000 and 2010.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau,
Rhode Island gained 4,248 people
(less than 0.04 percent population
growth) during that decade (Mackun
et al 2011). The population growth that
did occur, however small, was entirely
due to a growing minority population,

particularly in Providence. While whites
maintain a majority of the population,
the number of white residents actually
decreased in the last decade by 34,322
people (“Rhode Island Redistricting
Project”). The Hispanic population
was by far the most rapidly growing
ethnic group, increasing by 39,835
(Parker 2012). The minority population
increases thus have sustained Rhode
Island’s population growth and helped
maintain its two-district makeup.
However, Rhode Island does not have
a large enough concentrated minority
population to require the creation of a
majority-minority district.
Redistricting in 2012:
R aw P o li t i c s

Despite Rhode Island’s Democratic
tilt, the fact that it was neither gaining
nor losing a district, and the lack
of a majority-minority district, the
remapping process became convoluted
with much political maneuvering. The
2011 process had a distinctly political
tone, and featured an unusual public
spat between two colleagues within the
Democratic Party. Since redistricting
in Rhode Island was between two
Democratic districts, decisions about
who got what changes, and where,
operated as a zero-sum game: any
changes that benefited one politician
were detrimental to the other.
The timeline for the Rhode Island
process was as follows: the
commission was required to make
its recommendation to the General
Assembly by January 15, 2012, and the
General Assembly was required to vote
on a plan in time for it to be effective
for the 2012 elections. On December
19, 2011, the commission voted on draft
congressional lines, which were then
sent to the legislature for a vote. On
February 1, 2012, the Senate passed
S 2178, and on February 2, the House

passed identical bill H 7209. On
February 8, 2012, both were signed
into law by Governor Chafee. Following
these votes, the state House lines
were challenged in the courts, but no
court case was brought challenging the
congressional map.
The earliest plans unveiled by the
redistricting commission were
scrapped due to widespread criticism
from both Democrats and Republicans
on the grounds that they were too
drastic and too blatantly aimed at
bolstering District 2 Representative
David Cicilline’s political fortunes.
One, for example, known as “Plan E,”
would have moved three of the more
conservative towns to District 2 and
about half of Providence into District
1, shifting the districts of a total of
125, 276 people. The map eventually
approved by the legislature, “Plan F,”
scaled back these changes but still
moved significantly more people than
what was needed to equalize district
populations. As Figures 1 and 2 show,
the districts did not look that much
different in terms of geography. The
town of Burrillville had been moved
from District 1 into District 2 with more
portions of the city of Providence being
moved into District 1. However, Plan
F moved about 75,016 voters, even
though the difference between the old
districts due to population change had
been only 7,200 (Blake 2011).
The commission justified these
changes by stating that it had moved
more people than necessary so that
minorities could have a greater voice
in District 1. The newly redrawn
District 1 was now 75.86 percent
non-Hispanic White compared to
District 2, which was 83.83 percent
non-Hispanic White. As Table 1
shows, Hispanics make up the largest
minority group in both districts
(“Rhode Island Redistricting Project”).
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The commission, however, never
released data on the voting behavior
of minorities in these districts to
demonstrate that minority groups
would actually vote in a similar way,
which instantly generated speculation
that ulterior political motives were the
real explanation for the unnecessarily
large changes (Edgar 2011).
Most political leaders who supported
the approved plan commended it for
providing a greater voice to minorities.
Critics, however, characterized it as a
blatant attempt to pad the district with
additional Democratic voters to protect
Cicilline from what had been expected
to be a tight reelection campaign
(Blake 2011; Edgar 2012; Marcelo 2011;
Marcelo 2012).
In the months preceding the 2012
election, Cicilline had been accused of
misleading the public on the well-being
of the city of Providence’s finances in
his former job of mayor before running
for Congress. Whether these claims
were true, the details of the scandal left
much for his opponents to seize upon.
An official state report criticized him
for running a “dysfunctional” budget
system during his time as mayor that
left the city in a state of financial crisis
by the time he left office. To make
matters worse, the condition of the
city’s finances had not become public
knowledge until the new Mayor of
Providence had officially taken office,
and Cicilline had already been elected
to Congress. In fact, during his initial
campaign Cicilline commented that
the he was leaving the city’s finances
in “excellent condition”—a quote
his political opponents eagerly took
advantage of (Mulligan 2011). No
ethics violations or criminal charges
were ever filed, but his polling numbers
suffered as a result. He appeared
distinctly vulnerable going into the
2012 election (Cohen 2012).

Critics of the 2012 redistricting plan
thus claimed that the changes had
been motivated most by a desire to
make Cicilline more secure in light of
these accusations. Rep. Langevin of
the second district was particularly
critical of the changes, perhaps mainly
because the extra margin of safety
given to Cicilline had been provided at
his expense from his district. Brandon
Dougherty, Cicilline’s Republican
challenger, issued similar complaints,
calling the process “political
gamesmanship” (Marcelo 2011).
The most telling comment on the
politics though may have come from
Ray Rickman, a former Democratic
state representative and a citizen
member of the 2010 redistricting
commission. When asked about
politics in the redistricting process,
Rickman noted that the new plans
would definitely benefit Cicilline, and
that representatives redrawing maps
to assist themselves or other
politicians is “an American tradition.”
He went on to say “Nobody says it,
but [Cicilline] had a tough time getting
elected the first time, and he’s going
to catch hell the second. The people of
Burrillville are not going to vote for him.
He wants to get rid of them and I don’t
blame him. Do I like the politics? No.
Am I surprised? No,” (Klepper 2011).
The general consensus among close
political observers seems to be that
the new districts had been drawn to
benefit Cicilline, and that strengthening
the minority voice in the first district
was not the real motivation, even if
they modestly had that effect.

Figure 1: Rhode Island Congressional
Districts, 2002-2010

26

Figure 2: Rhode Island Congressional
Districts, 2012-2020

District
Number

Total
Population

White
NonHispanic
VAP

Black
NonHispanic
VAP

Asian
NonHispanic
VAP

Hispanic
VAP

Non-White
VAP

1

526,283

75.64%

6.15%

3.22%

11.94%

24.36%

2

526,284

83.83%

3.39%

2.90%

8.52%

16.17%

Table 1: Rhode Island Congressional Districts, 2012
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In addition to the controversy
surrounding Cicilline, other
criticisms were raised over the lack
of transparency in certain aspects of
the process. At one point Common
Cause suggested that the redistricting
process should stop, and that the
commission had provided “incomplete
information about maximizing
minority representation to justify their
decisions” (Edgar 2011). Some state
representatives also complained about
the lack of transparency, although
in general the protests over this lack
of information never moved beyond
statements of disapproval (Marcelo
2011; Klepper 2011).
Aside from comments about the
lack of information on the impact of
minorities, few objections to the new
congressional districts were raised
by minority groups. This may have to
do with the small size of the state’s
minority populations. These groups
gave more attention to the state
legislative districts, where minority
voters and representatives were more
heavily affected.
In addition, it is worth noting that the
relationship between Hispanics and
African-Americans in the state has
been tepid at best. The two groups
have competed for power in the State
House, often at the expense of the
other. For example, Rhode Island’s
voter ID law, an anomaly in such a
liberal state, was passed partly out of
voter concerns about corruption, but
also because of some support from
African-American politicians in the
R.I. House (Moakley 2013). The lack
of a united front by minority groups,
relatively small minority populations,
and a focus on state legislature
districts thus meant that the effect
of the new congressional districts on
minorities received little attention.

Despite controversy, the final
redistricting plan received
overwhelming support in the General
Assembly, and was signed by the
governor without major incident.
Governor Chafee, a former Republican
U.S. Senator who won the governor’s
office running as an Independent,
never voiced any criticisms of the
redistricting plan. A veto from the
governor, however, would have made
little difference since Democrats have
a veto-proof majority in the General
Assembly. This may partially explain
Chafee’s relative silence on the topic
(Blake 2011; Thornton 2012). No
court cases were filed against the
congressional districts;2 however, the
state Republican Party eventually did
file one against the new state House
districts map (Edgar 2012). Cicilline,
meanwhile, rebounded significantly in
the polls in the weeks preceding the
2012 general election, and in the end
he sailed to a decisive 53.0 percent to
40.8 percent victory over Republican
candidate Brendan Doherty. Langevin
also held his seat without difficulty,
garnering 55.7 percent of the vote (RI
Board of Elections 2012).
In hindsight, Cicilline’s victory is not
particularly surprising. Rhode Island
has a plurality of voters registered
as Independent, and these voters in
the past have been open to choosing
Republican candidates at the state
level. With that said, the state’s voters
have shown little taste for the policies
of the national Republican Party,
and candidates that get tied to more
conservative national candidates, such
as Mitt Romney, tend to do poorly.
Cicilline’s relative success then may
have more to do with his campaign’s
ability to tie Doherty to Romney than
with the relatively smaller changes to
his district (Cohen 2012).

Th e F u t u r e o f R e d i s t r i c t i n g
i n Rh o d e I s l a n d

By the end of the latest redistricting
session, a significant amount of
frustration with the process had
been voiced by various watchdog
groups. The exclusive power of the
legislative branch in the process, lack
of transparency, and the seemingly
brazen political motivations behind
the changes all rank highly on the list
of grievances. Even so, the chances
of actual reform in the process seem
dim at best, given the current state of
the system. Politicians in the General
Assembly will certainly resist the idea
of giving up some of their power to the
executive branch, never mind a truly
independent commission. Democratic
Party leaders would similarly have
little incentive to give up power when
they dominate the political process
so thoroughly, particularly during
the current string of Republican and
Independent governors. Perhaps more
importantly, state politicians have
yet to face significant pressure from
Rhode Island voters on the issue, since
redistricting tends to be a low visibility
issue. Without significant pressure
from the grassroots level, the process
is unlikely to change.
A political movement to change the
process before the next round of
redistricting, however, may make little
difference for the state’s congressional
districts. Rhode Island has started to
lose population since the last census,
after only barely managing to avoid
falling to single district status in the
last cycle. Unless this trend reverses,
Rhode Island will more than likely lose
one of its districts in 2020 and will no
longer need to be concerned about
redrawing its Congressional districts
(Parker 2012).
2

 iven the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to strike
G
down instances of partisan gerrymandering, it is hard
to imagine what sort of action might have succeeded.
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Conclusion

The last round of redistricting in
Rhode Island provides an excellent
example of how political the process
can become, even in a state where
one party dominates. Redistricting
in a two-district state can actually
be quite contentious at times, as this
case illustrates, since it essentially
boils down to a zero-sum game.
Changes in Rhode Island that benefited
the vulnerable Representative
Cicilline were made at the expense
of Representative Langevin, and
many critics alleged that political
maneuvering to protect Cicilline played
a heavy hand in the map’s design. In
response, the commission attempted
to justify its decision by saying
that the new map tries to increase
minority political power in District 1,
but this claim remains only partially
substantiated since the commission
refused to share information on voting
behavior. The process in the Ocean
State is unlikely to change due to lack
of visibility and political will, despite
widespread frustration from certain
interest groups. Even so, concerns
about redrawing congressional districts
will likely be rendered obsolete by
2020 if the state continues to lose
population over the next decade.
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